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Systems Analysis of Technological 
and Economic Dynamics 
This new research project at IIASA is concerned with modeling technological 
and organizational change; the broader economic developments that are as-
sociated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes by 
which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the 
capabilities to generate, imitate, and adopt technological and organizational 
innovations; and the aggregate dynamics - at the levels of single industries 
and whole economies - engendered by the interactions among agents which 
are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioral rules and expecta-
tions. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling 
techniques. However , the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and mod-
eling work is most fruitful when attention is paid to the known empirical 
details of the phenomena the work aims to address: therefore, a consider-
able effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts ' concerning 
corporate organization routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 
'demography' of firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress 
has been made on various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this 
work has employed ordinary differential and difference equations, and some 
of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken advantage of 
the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more 
traditional mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for 
modeling technological and economic dynamics is significantly richer than it 
was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical 
understanding. There are now many more detailed technological histories 
available. Much more is known about the similarities and differences of 
technical advance in different fields and industries and there is some under-
standing of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number 
of studies have provided rich information about how industry structure co-
evolves with technology. In addition to empirical work at the technology 
or sector level, the last decade has also seen a great deal of empirical re-
search on productivity growth and measured technical advance at the level 
of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists 
on the facts that seem associated with different rates of productivity growth 
across the range of nations, with the dynamics of convergence and divergence 
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in the levels and rates of growth of income in different countries, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is 
embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that success-
ful theory and useful modeling techniques ought to address now are much 
more clearly defined. The theoretical work described above often has been 
undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be ex-
plained. The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the micro-
economic evidence concerning for example dynamic increasing returns in 
learning activities or the persistence of particular sets of problem-solving 
routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal; all the way to the evidence 
regarding the time-series properties of major economic aggregates. However, 
the connection between the theoretical work and the empirical phenomena 
has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project is that the 
chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical tech-
niques can be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment 
where scholars who understand the empirical phenomena provide questions 
and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpreta-
tion of technological and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by 
which individual agents and organizations learn, search, and adapt; second, 
the economic analogs of 'natural selection' by which interactive environments 
- often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioral traits; and, third, the collective emergence of sta-
tistical patterns, regularities, and higher-level structures as the aggregate 
outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently at IIASA, the 
project coordinates multiple research efforts undertaken in several institu-
tions around the world, organizes workshops and provides a venue of scien-
tific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, computer 
simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research will focus upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organizational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition, and Macrodynamics 
Preface 
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the work being carried out on 
the topic "Learning Processes and Organizational Competence", one of the 
research areas of the Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dy-
namics project at IIASA. 
The paper tackles one of the key problems in understanding the dy-
namics of organizational capabilities: that of coordination of distributed 
knowledge, and, in particular, it focuses on the trade-off between diversity 
and commonality of knowledge in organizational learning processes. The 
methodology employed is rather new and seems particularly promising for 
this kind of analysis. It is a simulation model based on Classifiers Systems, a 
methodology developed in artificial intelligence, with the purpose of model-
ing learning as an adaptive process of category formation. The organization 
is represented as a collection of adaptively learning agents, linked to each 
other by information flows which define the very structure of the organiza-
tion (hierarchical vs. horizontal information flows). Organizational learning 
is seen therefore as a co-evolutionary process in which the characteristics and 
directions of information flows set a particular balance between decentral-
ized autonomous learning and the social construction of shared conventions 
and routines. 
In spite of the highly preliminary and exploratory nature of the model, 
simulation results cast a new light on the role that the structure of the 
organization plays in defining its capabilities to adapt to environments char-
acterized by different degrees of stationarity and predictability. 
v 
Giovanni Dosi 
Leader 
Systems Analysis of Technological 
and Economic Dynamics Project 
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Abstract 
This paper puts forward a preliminary investigation of the relationship 
between the distribution of knowledge and the capability of learning 
and adapting to changing environmental conditions in organizations. 
The main focus of the paper is on the trade-off each organization faces 
between commonality of knowledge, which enables coordination, and 
diversity of knowledge, which on the contrary favours learning and 
discovery of new ways of doing things. By means of a simulation 
model the paper compares the performance, in terms of coordination 
and learning, of different organizational designs, characterized by the 
way in which knowledge is distributed among the members of the 
organization and by the way coordination is achieved through centralized 
or decentralized coordinating devices. 
Resume 
Cet article propose une analyse preliminaire de la relation entre la 
distribution du savoir et la capacite d'apprentissage et d'adaptation des 
organisations face aux changements de leur environnement. L'article 
focalise sur I' arbitrage qui existe pour chaque organisation entre I' aspect 
commun du savoir, permettant la communication et la diversite des 
savoirs favorisant I' apprentissage et Jes nouvelles opportunites de 
modalites d'action. En utilisant un modele de simulation nous examinons 
la performance en termes de coordination et d'apprentissage des 
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differentes conceptions organisationnelles caracterisees par la maniere 
dont le savoir est distribue parmi Jes membres de I' organisation et par 
la maniere dont opere la coordination. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In every kind of economic organization, be it an organization stricto sensu, 
or a network of organizations and/or individuals, or a market, there exists 
a trade-off between commonality and diversity of knowledge. Sharing a 
common and homogeneous knowledge basis is a necessary condition for 
agents to communicate and coordinate their actions. But, on the other side, 
if all the members of an organization were sharing exactly the same body of 
individual knowledge no form of collective learning from each other would 
be possible and the organization would ultimately loose its capability of 
learning and adapting to new environmental conditions. 
This is clearly a typically evolutionary argument: collective adaptation and 
learning require diversity (mutation) but also mechanisms which guarantee 
the necessary overall coherence (selection). Ultimately, each economic 
organization can be considered as an evolutionary system which implements 
a particular balance between mechanisms of variation and mechanisms of 
selection on what constitutes the organizational knowledge basis. 
In economic organizations, this trade-off beetween commonality and 
diversity of knowledge is also strictly connected to the trade-off between 
exploitation and exploration (cf. March, 1991): organizations always face the 
dilemma between concentrating their resources on the exploitation of the 
knowledge which is already available to them and the exploration of new 
possibilities. Both exploitation and exploration are necessary for the survival 
of an organization. Without exploration of new possibilities, the organization 
would find itself trapped into sub-optimal states and would eventually become 
ill-adapted to changing environmental conditions. But organizations which 
devote all their resources to the exploration of new possibilities will face too 
high a degree of risk, and even in case of successful discoveries they fail 
to exploit the knowledge they acquire and will systematically perform worse 
than followers and imitators. 
March stresses the importance of the social context in which organizational 
learning takes place. A "distinctive feature of the social context... is the 
mutual learning of an organization and the individuals in it. Organizations 
store knowledge in their procedures, norms, rules, and forms. They accumulate 
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such knowledge over time, learning from their members. At the same time, 
individuals in an organization are socialized to organizational beliefs" (March, 
1991, p. 73). 
Within organizations, these two processes normally coexist and interact at 
different levels: one of the strengths of organizations is their capability of 
flexibly combining procedures for selection and procedures for innovation. 
Fast-learning and slow-learning individuals and departments can coexist. 
Innovation itself can become a largely routinized process, though uncertain 
in its outcome. Learning by doing can add exploratory value to normally 
exploitative activities. 
Mutual learning and the distribution of knowledge are fundamental 
factors which determine an organization's balance between the processes 
of exploration and exploitation. A high degree of differentiation of 
knowledge among the members of an organization increases the total amount 
of knowledge possessed by the organization. But differentiation makes 
coordination more difficult and ultimately can inhibit the social exploitation 
of this broad knowledge basis. On the contrary, a body of organizational 
knowledge which is commonly shared by all the members facilitates 
coordination but reduces the scope for decentralized experimentation, which 
could prove a vital source of organizational learning. 
Hence, there exists a tension between centralization and decentralization 
in the organizational learning process. Firms require both centralization 
and decentralization to operate successsfully in changing environments. 
Decentralization in the acquisition of knowledge is a source of variety, 
experimentation and, ultimately, a fundamental source of learning. But, 
eventually, knowledge has to be made available for exploitation to the entire 
organization. When agents differ with regard to their representations of the 
environment and their cognitive capabilities, there must exist an organizational 
body of knowledge which guarantees the coherence of the various learning 
processes. In order to cope with changing environments, the process of 
generation and modification of such a body of knowledge, although fed by the 
decentralized learning processes, has to undergo some form of centralization. 
Thus, a tension inevitably arises between the forces which keep the coherence 
of the organization and the forces which promote decentralized learning. 
This paper puts forward a preliminary investigation of these issues by means 
of a few simulation experiments which make use of a methodology similar to 
the so-called classifiers systems. The next section outlines a very basic 
organizational decision-making problem and the simulation methodology 
which can model substantive learning and the formation of collective 
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knowledge and languages. The following section will run a few simulations 
of this model in which the adaptive performance of different organizational 
designs - characterized by different modes of intra-organizational distribution 
of knowledge - will be tested against simple environments characterized by 
varying degree of variability and predictability. 
II. A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF LEARNING AND DECISION-
MAKING 
Let us begin by considering a standard problem of individual decision-
making, which will be then extented to a collective one. Let 
S = { 81 , S2, · · · , Sn } 
be the set of n possible states of nature and 
A = { a1 , a2 , · · · , ak } 
the set of the k possible actions the decision-maker can undertake. 
The payoff to the agent is given by a function: 
II= AXS ___, R 
where the agent's payoff to action a; when the state of the world sh occurs 
will be indicated by 1fih· 
The action the agent chooses depends obviously on the level of his or 
her knowledge about the state of the world. The agent's state of knowledge 
(or "information processing capabilities") can be represented by a collection 
of subsets 
P (s;) ?;;; S 
where P (s;) is the set of states of the world which the agent considers as 
possible (or cannot tell apart) when the real state is s;. The set of subsets 
P (s;) represents a sort of collection of categories which the agent employs 
in order to classify the environment and to find in those regularities which 
can be usefully exploited by his or her actions. 
Standard Bayesian decision theory and game theory postulate that the 
collection of such categories forms a partition of the set of states of the 
world, ruling out in this way the possibility of substantive ignorance and/or 
partial knowledge 1 of some parts of the environment, that is ignorance 
which cannot be reduced by simply acquiring new information, but only 
by modifying the very categories on which information collection and 
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interpretation are based (more on this in Marengo, 1992 b). But excluding 
substantive ignorance implies excluding the possibility of substantive learning, 
that is the construction of new, more useful mental models for the 
interpretation of reality, which cannot be reduced to simple probability 
updating, i. e. the acquisition of new information within a constant model 
of the world. 
More general representations of the agent's information processing 
capabilities than the probabilistic one can be found in the theories based on the 
concept of fuzzy sets (cf, for instance, Shafer, 1976; Dubois and Prade, 1988). 
In these theories information processing capabilities of decision makers are 
more generally represented by subsets of the power set of S (partitions being a 
special case). Substantive ignorance, surprise, inconsistencies can be naturally 
modelled in this framework. Learning, seen as category modification, can be 
therefore represented as a search in the space of subsets of the power set of 
S, i. e. the space of models of the world. 
The computational model which is here described is one the (infinite) 
possible models which consider learning as a movement in this space. It 
is based on classifiers systems (cf especially Holland, 1975 and 1986 and 
Holland et al., 1989) but with some substantial differences and simplifications. 
The basic component of this learning system is a condition-action rule, 
where the execution of a certain action is conditional upon the agent's 
perception that the present state of the world falls in one of the categories he 
or she has defined in his "mental model". The condition part is a "category", 
that is a subset of the states of nature and is activated when the last detected 
state of the world falls in such a subset. Practically, the condition is a string of 
n symbols (as many as the states of the world) over the alphabet { 0, l } and 
it is satisfied whenever the last state of the world corresponds to a position 
where a "1" appears. All in all, the condition 
with c, E { 0, 1 } 
is satisfied when, if sk is the last observed state of the world, we have: 
Thus, a set of conditions defines a subset of the power set of S. It 
is important to notice that each condition defines one subjective state (or 
category) of the world, as perceived by the agent and defines its relationship 
with the objective ("true") states of the world. This relationship remains 
anyway unknown to the decision maker, who "knows" only the subjective 
states. 
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This important point deserves an example: suppose there exist three "real" 
states of the world: 
S = { S1 , S2 , S3 } 
and the agent's state of knowledge is represented by the following two 
conditions: 
'!91 110 
'!92 101 
The agent conceives two "subjective" states of the world, '!91 and '!92. The 
agent thinks he or she is in the former when the real state of the world is 
either s1 or s2, whereas he or she believes to be in the latter when the real 
state is either s1 or s3 . This correspondence between subjective and objective 
states can only be described by an omniscient external observer and is not 
actually known by the agent, who ignores even the existence of the elements 
of the set S. All he or she knows are the two 'l9's. 
The action part is instead a string of length k (the number of the 
agent's possible actions) over the same alphabet and with the following 
straightforward interpretation: 
with ah E { 0, 1 } 
has one and only one position which equals "1": 
ah= 1 
and a; = 0 at every other position, meaning that the action "h" is chosen. 
The decision maker can be therefore represented by a set of such 
condition-action rules: 
where: 
with c; ah E { 0, 1 } 
In addition, each rule is assigned a "strength" and a "specificity" measure. 
The strength measures the past usefulness of the rule, that is the payoffs 
cumulated every time the rule has been applied (minus some other quantities 
which will be specified later); the specificity measures the strictness of the 
condition: in our case the highest specificity (or lowest generality) value 
is given to a rule whose condition has only one symbol "1" and therefore 
is satisfied when and only when that particular state of the world occurs, 
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whereas the lowest specificity (or the highest generality) is given to a rule 
whose condition is entirely formed by "1 's" and is therefore always satisfied 
by the occurrence of any state of the world. 
At the beginning of each simulation the decision maker is supposed to be 
completely ignorant about the characteristics of the environment he or she 
is going to face: all the rules initially generated have the highest generality, 
meaning that all their conditions are formed entirely by 1' s. The action parts 
are instead randomly generated, to represent the fact that, because of the 
condition of absolute ignorance, the decision maker does not have any reason 
to prefer an action to another. 
The decision maker is also assumed to have limited computational 
capabilities, therefore the number of rules stored in the system at each moment 
is kept constant and relatively "small" in comparison to the complexity of 
the problem which is being tackled. 
This set of rules is processed in the following steps throughout the 
simulation process: 
- Condition matching: a message is received from the environment which 
informs the system about the last state of the world. Such a message is 
compared with the condition of all the rules and the rules which are matched, 
i. e. those which apply to such a state of the world enter the following step. 
- Competition among matched rules: all the rules whose condition is 
satisfied compete in order to designate the one which is allowed to execute 
its action. To enter his competition each rule makes a bid based on its 
strength and on its specificity. In other words, the bid of each matched rule is 
proportional to its past usefulness (strength) and its relevance to the present 
situation (specificity): 
Where ki, k2 and k3 are constant coefficients. 
The winning rule is chosen randomly, with probabilities proportional to 
such bids. 
- Action and strength updating: the winning rule executes the action 
indicated by its action part and has its own strength reduced by the amount 
of the bid and increased by the payoff that the action receives, given the 
occurrence of the "real" state of the world. If the j-th rule is the winner of 
the competition, we have: 
Strength (R1, t+l)=Strength (R1 , t)+Payoff (t) - Bid (R1, t) 
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- Generation of new rules: the system must be able not only to select the 
most successful rules, but also to discover new ones. This is ensured by 
applying "genetic operators" which, by recombining and mutating elements 
of the already existing and most successful rules, introduce new ones which 
could improve the performance of the system. In this way new rules are 
constantly injected into the system and scope for new opportunities is always 
made availale. 
Genetic operators generate new rule which explore other possibilities in the 
proximity (in a sense which I am going to define precisely) of the presently 
most successful ones, in order to discover the elements which determine 
their success and exploit them more thoroughly: the search is not completely 
random but influenced by the system's past history. New rules so generated 
substitute the weakest ones stored in the system, so that the total number 
of rules is kept constant. 
Two genetic operators have been used for the condition and one for the 
action part. The latter can be defined "local search" and is simply a mutation 
in the vicinity: the action included in the newly generated rule is chosen 
(randomly) in the close proximity of the one included in the parent rule. 
The interpretation of this operator is straightforward: decision makers tend to 
explore alternatives in the vicinity of the ones already employed. 
The two operators used for the condition part deserve more attention 
because of their role in modelling the evolution of the state of knowledge 
embedded into the system. They operate in opposite directions: 
- Specification: a new condition is created which increases the specificity 
of the parent one: wherever the parent condition presents a "1 ", this is mutated 
into a "O" with a given small probability. 
- Generalization: the new condition decreases the specificity of the parent 
one: wherever the latter presents a "O", this is mutated into a "l" with a 
given small probability: 
Specification and generalization are two possible cognitive strategies which 
tend to drive the learning system towards, respectively, specific rules which 
apply to more specific states of the world and more general rules which instead 
cover a wider set of states of the world. Different degrees of specification 
and generalizations can be simulated both by means of different combinations 
of these two genetic operators and by varying the coefficient k3 with which 
specificity enters the bid equation: the higher this coefficient, the more highly 
specific rules will be likely to prevail over general ones. The simulations 
discussed in the rest of the paper will use a specificity coefficient to summarize 
the overall inclination of the system toward the search for specific rules, such 
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coefficient will represent both the value k3 in the bid equation and the 
probability of application of the genetic operator "specification" every time 
the genetic operators routine is called. 
III. HOMOGENEITY VS DIVERSITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN ORGA-
NIZATIONAL LEARNING: SOME SIMULATION RESULTS 
This section employs the computational model of learning outlined in 
the previous section in order to analyze, by running a few simulations, 
how different modes of knowledge distribution within an organization can 
influence the direction and speed of collective learning. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, organizations face a trade-off 
between the need for coordination, which enables the exploitation of the 
available knowledge, and the need for expanding and modifying the available 
knowledge, which is an essential condition for search and exploration of 
new possibilities. 
Coordination requires a collective knowledge basis, consciously shared by 
the agents involved in a given interaction. In a world - like the one postulated 
by standard neoclassical economics - where agents share the same model 
of the world or know each other's model, the only obstacle to effective 
coordination could derive from some form of lack, bias or strategic use of 
information. In a world instead where decision makers do not entirely share 
a given model and do not know a priori each other's models, the first issue 
becomes that of building a collective knowledge basis which enables agents to 
communicate effectively and eventually achieve coordination. If, for instance, 
one individual or part of the organization communicates to another that, to 
the best of their knowledge, the present state of the world is X and such 
communication is faithful (and known as such to the other), the meaning of 
such a piece of information can still be misunderstood because the receiver has 
different information processing capabilities from the sender's. For example 
the proposition "the state of the world is X" can have for the receiver a 
different meaning (when the considered subset of the states of the world's 
power set is not the same for the two agents) or even no meaning at all 
(when X does not exist in the receiver's information processing capabilities). 
But if, on one side, allowing for diversity of knowledge opens new problems 
for organizational design and is a possible source of inefficiency (cf. also 
the so-called "loss of control" literature e.g. Calvo and Wellisz, 1978), on 
the other side diversity of knowledge is a fundamental source for new ideas, 
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new bodies of knowledge which can be acquired and exploited by the entire 
organization. 
The model outlined in the previous section can help cast some light on 
this dilemma. 
Consider the following coordination problem faced by an organization: the 
organization (a firm, for instance) has to respond to an exogenous environment 
by implementing some collective action. Suppose for instance that a firm can 
produce a certain number of product types, which are demanded by an 
exogenous market, and that the production process is divided into several 
parts, each of them being carried out by a different shop. The problem is 
therefore to detect correctly which product type is being demanded (state of 
the world) and to coordinate the actions of the different shops so that the 
correct production process is implemented. 
More specifically, suppose that there exist eight possible product types 
(states of the world), called respectively "1", "2", ... "8". The firm's production 
possibilities set is represented by sequences of operations which can be of 
two types (A and B). Such sequences have all the same length and map into a 
product type, which is conventionally designated by the number of operations 
of type A which are utilized in its production. For example the product of 
type "8" is produced by all and only the production processes which contain 
eight operations of type A. Each production process is divided into two parts 
(of the same length) which are carried out separately by each of two shops. 
The problem of the firm is therefore to forecast the product type which 
will be demanded by the market and to implement the correct production 
process by coordinating the operations of the two shops. The payoff is the 
following: if the firm produces the correct product type it receives a payoff 
of 5 units; if it does not produce the correct output it receives a negative 
payoff, given by the distance of the actual product type from the required 
one (for example, if the market demands type "7" but the firm produces type 
"5", it will receive the payoff 2). 
This is a rather naive model, but it already represents quite a complex 
coordination problem; in game theoretic terms we have two players (the two 
shops) who have four possible strategies each (i . e. implementing a production 
process with a number of operations of type A which can vary from one to 
four) and can play one out of eight possible different games, each of them 
with a different payoff matrix. 
Suppose now that the all the decision-making units which the organization 
is made of are represented by agents whose knowledge of the state of the 
world evolves exactly in the way presented in the previous part. Their state 
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of knowledge is represented by a subset of the power set of the set of 
states of world. Moreover they are completely ignorant at the outset (they 
cannot distinguish among the eight possible states of the world) and refine 
their knowledge structure according to their experience and their cognitive 
capabilities. 
The following simulations will test the behaviour of a simple but quite 
general organizational structure (visualized in Figure 1), composed by a 
"management" and two shops. The management observes the environmental 
message (the last state of the world) and interprets it according to its, evolving, 
"model of the world" and sends a message to the two shops. 
ENVIRONMENT 
MANAGEMENT 
lB lB 
2 
~-s_H_o_r __ i __ ~l--<--3----->>I ~ __ s1_1_o_r_2 ___ J 
Figure 1. Organizational information flows. 
Each of the two shops can, in general, observe three kinds of signals 
and develop an interpretative model for each them. These signals are, 
respectively, the environmental signal (last observed state of the world), 
the message sent by the management (and based on its own interpretation of 
the environment), and the signal sent by the other shop (i. e. its last action). 
The latter two messages are coordinating devices, respectively a centralized 
and a decentralized one, which allow the shops to coordinate their action, 
whereas the former allows the two shops to form their own independent 
(from the management's) model of the world. 
The weights with which these three types of messages enter the shop's 
decision processes define the organizational balance between differentiation 
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and commonality of knowledge. In our model, such weights are represented 
by the specificity coefficients which express the agent's search for a precise 
model which interprets the corresponding type of message. 
A high specificity coefficient for the shops' condition parts which classify 
messages coming from the environment (messages of type lB in Figure 1) 
implies that shops are aiming at building a detailed individual model of 
the world. A low coefficient implies instead that shops do not care to 
"understand" the environment. When the coefficient is equal to zero we 
have an organization in which shops do not form any autonomous model of 
the world but rely entirely on the interpretation of the world given by the 
management (messages of type I and 2). 
A high specificity coefficient for the condition part which classifies 
messages coming from the management (messages of type 2 in Figure I) 
implies that shops attribute great importance to the correct interpretation 
of the coordinating messages which are sent by the management. A low 
coefficient implies instead that shops are not seeking careful coordination 
on the organizational collective knowledge. When the coefficient is equal to 
zero we have an organization without any form of centralized coordination, 
i. e. the management has no role. 
Finally, a high specificity coefficient for the condition part which classifies 
messages coming from the other shop (messages of type 3 in Figure 1) implies 
that shops are attaching high importance to mutual, decentralized coordination. 
When the coefficient is equal to zero we have an organization without any 
form of decentralized coordination, i. e. no inter-shop communication. 
Thus, by designing experiments with different combinations of the three 
specificity coefficients, it is possible to test the performance of different 
organizational balances between centralized and decentralized mechanism of 
coordination and knowledge distribution: 
Simulation 1. Let us first consider a stationary environment with constant 
state of the world. Simulations show that: 
- coordination can be achieved if there is no model-learning at all i. e. 
specificity coefficients are all equal to zero) due to the action of selection 
mechanisms. Agents do not "understand" anything of the environment in 
which they operate, but select randomly actions until they find the good ones 
and then stick to them. This appears, in our simple example, as the fastest 
way to achieve coordination in stationary environments. 
- coordination can be equally achieved, although after a greater number 
of iterations, when either the management or the shops are learning about 
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Figure 2. Stationary Environment. 
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the environment, provided this learning is paralleled by learning about the 
interpretation of coordinating messages, either centralized or decentralized; 
- coordination cannot instead be properly mantained when agents are 
individually learning about the environment, but not about any of the 
coordinating devices. In this case selection mechanisms tend to make 
coordination temporarily emerge, but this action is counteracted by individual 
search, which constantly breaks such coordination. 
To summarize, agents can coordinate - in stationary environments - by 
randomly selecting among actions and stick to a good one when it has been 
selected, without building any model of the environment. If instead they 
try to learn, i. e. to build such a model and constantly improving it, they 
need also to learn a model for the interpretation of coordinating messages: 
messages 1 and/or IB are not sufficient, and messages 2 or 3 are also needed. 
Figure 2 summarizes these results, by plotting the average cumulated payoff 
of the different organizational set-ups, with different specificity coefficients 
on different messages. 
Simulation 2. A sudden and big environmental shock is introduced in 
a previously stationary environment. The experiment is designed in the 
following way: for the first 500 iterations the product type "3" is constantly 
demanded, at iteration 501 the demand suddenly switches to the type "7" and 
remains there thereafter. The problem is therefore to reorganize radically the 
routines which, after 500 iterations with the same product type, are already 
deeply embedded in the organization. 
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Simulations show that a search for specific rules is in this case necessary 
to respond to the environmental change. In particular, a high specificity 
coefficient for the conditions which classify the environmental message is 
essential for speeding up the adaptation process. 
Figure 3 plots these results. 
Simulation 3. The previous experiment considered one environmental 
shock which require a radical change of organizational routines, now we 
consider instead an environment which is always changing, but according to 
a regular pattern. The experiment supposes that the demanded product type 
switches from "3" to "4" and vice versa at every iteration. 
Simulations (cf. Fig. 4) show that only when the specificity coefficients on 
the shops' conditions which classify environmental messages are high can the 
organization exploit the environmental regularity. Otherwise the organization 
cannot exploit this regularity and settles into constantly producing either 
types, with an average payoff of 2. 
Simulation 4. Let us consider now continuous but unpredictable 
environmental changes, so that a precise forecast of the demanded product 
type is impossible. The product type which is being demanded varies 
randomly among three possible ones ("3", "4" and "5") at each iteration. 
Environmental changes are therefore confined to a subset of the possible 
states of the world, but are unpredictable inside such a subset: the learning 
problem for the organization types is therefore to define an "internal state" 
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which corresponds to the three possible environmental states and link it to 
the constant action of always producing type "4". 
Contrary to the previous case, high specificity coefficients on the shops' 
conditions which classify environmental messages reduce the organizational 
peforrnance, which is instead increased by high specificity coefficients on 
the shops' conditions which classify managerial signals. Results are reported 
in Figure 5. 
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By comparing the results of the previous two simulations some interesting 
conclusions can be drawn. To exploit a regularly changing environment a high 
amount of knowledge about the environment itself is required: the model must 
distinguish between the states of the world and connect them diachronically. 
It is not surprising therefore that the most appropriate organization in such 
circumstances is the one which, by partly decentralizing the acquisition of 
knowledge about the environment, can achieve higher levels of sophistication 
in its model of the world, provided the coordination mechanisms - which are 
here centralized - are powerful enough to enable the organization to solve 
conflicts of representations. 
On the other hand, this very decentralization of the acquisition of knowledge 
can be a source of loss when it is more profitable for the organization to 
cling to a robust and stable set of routines. This situation requires strong 
coordination in order to make the entire organization implement coherently 
such a set of robust routines. Autonomous and decentralized experimentation 
can only disrupt such a coherence. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Diversity and coherence are general features of every evolving system, 
and in social organizations they are reflected by the difficult balance between 
the need for coordination of individual actions and the need for diversity 
of individual knowledge bases from which collective learning emerges. The 
simple simulation model outlined in this paper shows that coherence is a 
non-trivial problem whenever one departs from the assumption that agents 
share a common representation of the environment in which they operate. On 
the other hand, distributed knowledge and plurality of representations is an 
essential mechanisms for promoting collective learning and adaptation. 
Simulations show that centralized coordination mechanisms seem especially 
important both in simple and stationary environments and in turbulent and 
unpredictable ones: in both cases centralized coordination mechanisms could 
prove essential to prevent the organization from loosing its overall coherence 
because of diverging individual learning processes. When instead adaptation to 
regularly changing environments is needed, decentralized learning processes 
are fundamental, provided that coordination mechanisms make the results of 
such individual learning processes shared by the entire organization. 
Further research in this direction should investigate the properties of 
specific institutional mechanisms which concretely realize this balance, by 
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defining the social division of labour, incentive schemes and the directions 
and characteristics of information flows. Of course each of these issues has 
been already widely analyzed (cf. for instance Williamson, 1985) but in a 
usually static context in which the role such mechanisms play in the dynamic 
processes of social learning is not taken into account. Division of labour, 
incentives and the distribution of knowledge and information do not only 
affect the static efficiency of an economic system, but also its capability to 
generate new knowledge and adapt to changing environmental conditions. 
In general a trade-off between will likely exist between static efficiency and 
learning capabilities. 
Finally, the distinction between knowledge and information which has been 
suggested in this paper could prove a very useful dimesion for institutional 
analysis. For instance, a perfect market strongly centralizes informations, by 
reducing to a single parameter - market price - all the information agents 
need, but leaves knowledge of tastes and technologies ("representations") 
widely distributed (cf. also Hayek, 1937). Organizations such as firms 
implement some form of intermediate centralization/decentralization of 
information and knowledge (complete centralization of knowledge being 
impossible because of bounded rationality, whereas centralization of 
information is more and more feasible thanks to new communication and 
data-processing techonologies). Comparisons of markets vs. hierarchies from 
this perspective could provide new insights which cannot emerge from the 
static view implicit in transaction costs economics (cf also Winter, 1982). 
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